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pAbstract: This paper exploits the episode provided by the mass migration from the
former Soviet Union to Israel in the 1990s to study the effect high skill immigration
on productivity. Using a unique data set on manufacturing firms, I investigate directly
whether firms and industries with a higher concentration of immigrants experienced
increases in productivity. The analysis finds no correlation between immigrant
concentration and productivity at the firm level in cross-sectional and pooled
regressions. First-differences estimates reveal, if anything, a negative correlation
between the change in output per worker and the change in the immigrant share.
The immigrant share was strongly negatively correlated with productivity in low-tech
industries. In high-technology industries, the results point to a positive relationship,
hinting at complementarities between technology and the skilled immigrant workforce.
JEL codes: J61, F22, D24
Keywords: Immigration, Productivity1. Introduction
The last twenty years have seen an increase in the share of highly skilled immigrants
in many OECD countries (Chaloff and Lemaître, 2009). At the same time, many coun-
tries are promoting or actively considering policies aimed at encouraging further high-
skilled migration. The rationale for these policies is that highly skilled immigrants may
boost innovation (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010); create jobs for native workers
(Zavodny, 2011); induce natives to specialize in jobs in which they have a comparative
advantage (Peri and Sparber, 2009); or perhaps it is simply necessary to “import” mi-
grant workers to address labor shortages in specific sectors.
However, it is not unambiguously clear that highly skilled immigrants would neces-
sarily boost productivity. First, human capital acquired abroad may not be entirely
transferable to the host economy (Friedberg, 2000), possibly because immigrants have
weak language skills that reduce their productivity (Bleakley and Chin, 2004). Second, the
absorption of even high-skilled immigrants may require some vocational training (either
private or government-sponsored, Cohen-Goldner and Eckstein, 2010), which may de-
press productivity, at least in the short run. Finally, it is not obvious that the positive asso-
ciation between high skilled immigration and outcomes observed in cross-sectional data,
at current levels of immigration, will necessarily carry over if migration policy were to be
changed in a way that would substantially increase the influx of high-skilled workers.2013 Paserman; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
Paserman IZA Journal of Migration 2013, 2:6 Page 2 of 31
http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/6In this paper, I investigate whether a large and sudden influx of high-skilled workers
increases productivity, exploiting the unique episode provided by the mass migration
from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) to Israel during the 1990s. From the last quarter
of 1989 until 2001, over 1 million immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
arrived in Israel, increasing its population and labor force by extraordinary rates. At the
peak of the immigration wave in 1990 and 1991, over 330 thousand FSU Jews immi-
grated to Israel, increasing Israel’s potential labor force by 8 percent and its population
by 15 percent. In addition to its size, another unique aspect of this immigration wave is
that many of the immigrants were highly educated. About 60 percent of the FSU immi-
grants who arrived between 1989-1990 were college-educated and almost one-fourth
were college graduates. In contrast, only about 30 percent of the native Israeli Jews in
1990 were college educated, and 12 percent were college graduates.
I use a unique data set on Israeli manufacturing firms and investigate directly
whether firms and industries with a higher concentration of immigrants experienced
increases in productivity. The analysis is carried out by running conventional produc-
tion function regressions, where the share of immigrants is treated as an additional
right hand side variable. This econometric specification is obtained directly from
microeconomic principles if one assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function, perfect
substitutability between native and immigrant labor, and possible differences in the effi-
ciency units of labor provided by native and immigrant workers. The coefficient on the
share of immigrants will be positive if immigrant workers are more productive (because
they are more educated, innovative, inherently more hard-working, or other reasons)
and negative if immigrants are less productive (because of language barriers, low trans-
ferability of human capital, or other reasons). Thus, the model directly nests the two
competing theories about the effect of high-skill immigration on productivity.
The analysis reveals a number of interesting results. First, despite their high levels of
formal education, immigrants were initially employed in low-skill occupations, and
moved up the occupational ladder only a number of years after arrival. This is consist-
ent with evidence from other studies that used individual-level data (Weiss et al., 2003;
Eckstein and Weiss, 2002 and 2004). Second, a firm’s immigrant share in 1993, shortly
after the peak of the immigration wave, can be predicted by a number of pre-
immigration firm characteristics: firms that in 1990 had a high capital/labor ratio, paid
low wages and were in industries with a low-educated workforce employed a relatively
high share of immigrants. By 1997, many of these correlations were weakened or
reversed. Third, in cross-sectional and pooled OLS production function regressions, I
find no evidence that the immigrant share is correlated with productivity. First-
differences estimates reveal, if anything, a negative correlation between the change in
output per worker and the change in the immigrant share. Fourth, the immigrant share
was strongly negatively correlated with productivity in low-tech industries. In high-tech
industries, the results are somewhat mixed, but tend to point to a positive relationship,
hinting at complementarities between technology and the skilled immigrant workforce.
One potential shortcoming with this analysis is that immigrants do not sort them-
selves across firms randomly, casting doubt on whether the coefficients can be given a
causal interpretation. While this is a legitimate concern, it should also not be exagger-
ated. First, the first evidence points to little or no relationship between the share of im-
migrants in a firm in 1993 and pre-immigration productivity levels. Second, I can
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sible to address the potential endogeneity of the key right-hand-side variable using an
instrumental variable strategy. The instrument for the actual immigrant share is the im-
migrant share predicted solely by the total number of immigrants in the post-1989
period and the distribution of immigrants across industries in 1983. This industry-level
analysis also allows me to investigate whether there were any knowledge spillovers at
the industry level. Both the OLS and IV results confirm the findings of the firm-level
analysis, namely that there is no evidence of a productivity-enhancing effect of immi-
gration. Finally, even if the concerns about endogeneity are not completely assuaged,
the relationship between immigration (and high-skill immigration in particular) and
productivity has received so little attention in the literature, that even a purely descrip-
tive/correlational analysis represents an important contribution to our knowledge.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next Section connects the paper to
the existing literature on immigration and productivity, and other related areas.
Section 3 presents some general macroeconomic trends in the Israeli economy between
1970 and 1999, and in the manufacturing sector in particular. Section 4 describes the
data. Section 5 discusses the distribution of immigrants across firms and industries in
1993 and 1997. Section 6 presents the basic estimates of the production function, as
well as additional robustness tests and specification tests. Section 7 concludes.2. Literature review
The paper makes contributions to five different strands of literature. First, it is one of
the first studies to look directly at the relationship between immigration and productiv-
ity. Using state-level data from the United States, Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny (2002)
find that labor productivity increased more slowly in states that attracted a larger share
of immigrants in the 1980s, both in low-skill and high-skill industries; on the other
hand, Peri (2012), also using U.S. data, but focusing more on the long-run impact, finds
that immigration had a strong positive association with total factor productivity and a
negative association with the high skill-bias of production technologies. Studies from
other countries have also reached contrasting conclusions: Kangasniemi et al. (2012) find
that immigration made a negative contribution to labor productivity growth in Spain, and
a negative but negligible contribution in the UK, as well as mixed effects on total factor
productivity. Huber et al. (2010) analyze productivity at the sectoral level in 12 EU coun-
tries, and find little evidence to suggest that migrants on the whole have raised productiv-
ity, although high-skilled migrants do appear to play a positive role in productivity
developments in skill-intensive industries. The current study arguably improves on the
existing literature because of the focus on high skill immigration, and because it exploits
information on immigrant concentration at the firm level, a unique feature of my data set.
Second, this paper joins the growing the literature that attempts to understand how
firms and industries respond to migration waves. Lewis (2003) finds that relative labor
supply shocks have little effect on the local industry mix; instead, industries respond to
these shocks by changing their relative factor intensities. Lewis (2011) further corrobo-
rates these findings by showing that in markets with a higher availability of less-skilled
labor, manufacturing plants are less likely to introduce automated production tech-
niques. Lewis argues that these endogenous changes in production techniques may
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immigration-induced labor supply shocks. Gandal, Hanson and Slaughter (2004) obtain
similar results in the Israeli context: they find that global changes in production
techniques were sufficient to more than offset Israel’s change in relative factor supplies
induced by the Soviet immigration, while changes in output mix did not help Israel
absorb changes in relative factor prices. These studies, however, did not have micro
data on the distribution of immigrants across establishments, and therefore could not
investigate directly the effect of immigrants on plant productivity.
Third, the paper contributes to our understanding of the effects of immigration on
the host economy’s labor market. Much of the previous work on the impact of immi-
gration on the host economy’s labor market has found that wages are only mildly nega-
tively affected by the influx of competing workers1. This suggests that offsetting flows of
labor or capital, or improvements in firms’ productivity must occur in order for native
wages to maintain their pre-immigration level. This last scenario could well be plausible in
the Israeli case, because of the high skill content of the immigrant population. Indeed, the
aggregate data reveal that the manufacturing sector, which employed a disproportionate
share of FSU immigrants, experienced sustained growth in output per worker and total fac-
tor productivity during the 1990s. While it is possible that this was simply part of the global
trend of faster productivity growth in manufacturing,2 it is worth investigating whether the
high-skilled immigration may have also made a contribution.
Fourth, the paper is related to the literature on the effects of a highly educated work-
force on labor productivity. Moretti (2004) finds robust evidence of educational spillovers
in U.S. manufacturing: the productivity of plants in cities that experience large increases
in the share of college graduates rises more than the productivity of similar plants in cities
that experience small increases in the share of college graduates. Exploiting the longitu-
dinal nature of his data, Moretti can address the most relevant endogeneity and selectivity
issues by including plant and city fixed effects: however, his data cannot conclusively rule
out the possibility that time-varying productivity shocks are correlated with changes in
the overall level of human capital in a city. One advantage of my study is that it allows me
to investigate the productivity effects of the large, unexpected, and arguably exogenous
shock to the stock of human capital represented by the Soviet immigration to Israel3.
Finally, the paper helps us to understand the determinants of growth in the Israeli
economy in the 1990s. Hercowitz (2002), and Hercowitz, Lavi and Melnick (1999),
using macroeconomic time series data up to 1995, find that immigration has a negative
short-run impact on TFP growth. They interpret these results as a consequence of the
immigrants’ slow process of adjustment to the labor market, implicitly arguing that
TFP should have picked up once the adjustment process had been completed. My paper
sheds light on this issue by extending the analysis to the end of the decade: this is a par-
ticularly interesting period of analysis, because by this time the most difficult part of the
immigrants’ adjustment process had already been completed, and because the Israeli
economy experienced a surge in productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s.
3. Israeli productivity, 1970-1999: macroeconomic trends
Table 1 presents the average yearly growth rates in total output per worker and in total
factor productivity, by decade, between 1970 and 19994. Output per worker and total
factor productivity grew at a sustained and similar rate during the 1970s, but growth
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again, with the manufacturing sector leading the charge in both output per worker and
TFP. Figure 1 presents the evolution of output per worker for the entire Israeli econ-
omy and for the manufacturing sector alone, between 1970 and 2000. The two series
grew at fairly similar rates between 1970 and 1993, but since then manufacturing
output per worker has taken off at a fast rate, while overall output per worker has
remained essentially constant. Figure 2 illustrates that much of the 1990s growth in the
manufacturing sector was concentrated in high and medium-high technology indus-
tries, even though low and medium-low tech industries also experienced growth in the
latter part of the decade5.
At the same time, many of the post-1989 immigrants6 found employment in the
manufacturing sector, as can be seen by Table 2, which is based on data from the Israeli
Labor Force Surveys between 1990 and 1999:7 throughout the decade, the share of
immigrants in manufacturing was nearly double that of natives. Given the high level of
educational attainment of immigrants (and in particular the high concentration of
engineers),8 it is natural to think that there may be a causal link between immigrant
employment and growth in the manufacturing sector.
Figure 3 presents the decomposition of manufacturing output in the 1990s into its
components: value added per worker, labor, capital per worker,9 and total factor prod-
uctivity. We see that labor input increased sharply in the first part of the decade, and
then remained fairly constant in the second part. The mirror image of this trend can be
seen in the evolution of capital per worker: it dropped by about 10 percent between
1990 and 1992, before rebounding to its initial level by 1995, and then growing very
quickly in the second part of the decade. This matches the prediction of a simple eco-
nomic model in which the capital stock is fixed in the short run, but can adjust in the long
run in response to immigration, to take advantage of the higher marginal productivity that
arises following the influx of workers10. Both value added per worker and TFP fluctuated
in the first part of the decade, and then began to grow steadily since 1995.
Figure 4 also shows that the manufacturing sector experienced skill upgrading
during the 1990s. The proportion of workers with high education (some college or
more) rose steadily throughout the decade, from about 26 percent in 1990 to 43
percent in 1999. This may reflect the growing share of immigrants with high educa-
tion in manufacturing employment, but also the increasing educational attainment
of the non-immigrant workforce. When measuring skill by the proportion of workers
in white-collar occupations, we see a slightly different picture: the share of white
collar workers fell in the first part of the decade (from about 21 to 19 percent), but
then grew very quickly in the second part of the decade. This likely reflects the occu-
pational upgrading of the FSU immigrants, a phenomenon which has already beenTable 1 Output per worker and total factor productivity in Israel, 1970-1999
Average yearly change
Output per worker Total factor productivity
Manufacturing Total private sector Manufacturing Total private sector
1970-1979 4.42% 4.58% 2.22% 2.81%
1980-1989 1.67% 1.51% 0.15% 0.91%
1990-1999 3.14% 1.04% 1.63% 0.70%













Manufacturing and the Entire Private Sector
Israeli Output per Worker, 1970-2000
Figure 1 Israeli output per worker, 1970-2000.
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and Weiss, 2002 and 2004).
Summing up, it appears that the manufacturing sector as a whole, and in particular
high technology industries within this sector, were the main engines of growth in the
Israeli economy in the latter part of the 1990s. At the same time, the manufacturing
sector absorbed large numbers of highly educated immigrants, who gradually shifted
from blue-collar to white-collar occupations. In the next sections we will try to analyze
whether these two phenomena are linked at a more disaggregated level.
4. Data
The main source of data for my analysis is represented by the 1990-1999 Industrial








1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
year
Low tech Medium-low tech
Medium-high tech High tech
1990 = 100
By technological intensity
Manufacturing output per worker, 1990-1999
Figure 2 Manufacturing output per worker, by technological intensity.
Table 2 Employment distribution of immigrants and natives by industry 1991-1999
Males Females
Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives
Agriculture 2.14 3.88 1.83 1.42
Mining and Manufacturing 41.68 25.15 25.53 11.42
Electricity and Water 1.23 1.62 0.27 0.36
Construction 12.39 9.93 0.88 0.97
Commerce, Restaurants and Hotels 10.90 16.00 15.44 12.92
Transport, Storage and Communication 4.35 9.11 1.54 3.33
Financing and Business Services 8.98 11.59 10.79 13.87
Public and Community Services 13.12 17.84 31.41 47.33
Personal and Other Services 5.22 4.88 12.31 8.38
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.0
Percentage Immigrants 9.50 11.21
Note: Author’s calculations from the 1991-1999 Labor Force Surveys.
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persons. Griliches and Regev (1995) used these same surveys to study productivity in
Israeli firms during the 1980s.
The Industrial Surveys have been conducted regularly by the CBS since 1955. The
surveys can be viewed as a succession of short panels, since every few years the
sampling frame is redesigned and a new sample of establishments is drawn based on
probability sampling. Large establishments (with more than 75 employed persons), and
a number of smaller establishments in some economic branches are sampled with
certainty, while smaller establishments are sampled with a probability determined by
establishment size and economic branch. The sampled establishments are then
followed for a number of years, until the next sample redesign. In the period under
analysis, there were two redesigns of the sample: the 1989 redesign, which is the basis
for the 1990-1994 surveys, and the 1994 redesign, which is the basis for the 1995-1999
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Manufacturing, 1990-1999
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1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1999
Year...
Share high education Share white-collar
Source: Labor Force Surveys, 1990-1999
Skill Content in the Manufacturing Sector
Figure 4 Skill Content in the Manufacturing Sector, 1990-1999.
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ments in each year that were present in 1995. As can be seen, more than 800 establishments
in the 1995 sample were already present in 1990, and nearly 700 establishments are sampled
continuously between 1990 and 199911.
The Industrial Surveys provide information on the usual income and expenditure var-
iables at the firm level: local sales and exports, inventory changes, intermediate inputs,
investments broken down by type (buildings, equipment, and vehicles), labor, and
wages. These basic data were used to calculate gross output and value added. To calcu-
late each establishment’s fixed capital stock, I proceeded as follows: first, I linked each
establishment to data on the fixed capital stock at the three-digit industry level from
the CBS’s 1992 Survey of the Fixed Gross Capital Stock. I then assumed that the capital-
output ratio is constant within each industry to obtain an estimate of each establishment’s




in the sample in 1990
Number of establishments
in the sample in 1995
1990 2085 2085 822
1991 2151 1936 857
1992 2158 1826 878
1993 2254 1754 911
1994 2316 1666 957
1995 2041 822 2041
1996 1987 799 1879
1997 1950 768 1761
1998 1903 739 1652
1999 1865 713 1551
Total number of firms in the sample: 4378
Firms continuously in the sample, 1990-1999 698
Note: Author’s calculations from the 1990-1999 Manufacturing Surveys. Boldface entries represent the number of firms in
the first year of each sample redesign.
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years 1990 and 1991), and the linear depreciation formulae used in Regev (1993)12.
The CBS follows standard OECD definitions and classifies all industrial sectors into
four different levels of technological intensity. I follow this standard classification
throughout the paper. Table 4 presents summary statistics on the number of firms, on
total employment, and on the composition of the labor force for the four levels of
technological intensity. High-technology firms represented 7 percent of the sample in
1990, but employed about 13 percent of the total number of workers in manufacturing.
By 1997, the number of high tech firms in the sample had risen to 9 percent, employing
now 16 percent of the manufacturing workforce, a 41 percent increase in the level of
employment. Note however that employment growth was not confined to the high-
tech sector alone: employment grew by about 6 percent in the low-tech sector, and by
about 47 percent in the medium-low tech sector. Table 4 also shows that the OECD
classification reflects fairly accurately the educational composition of the workforce:
workers in the high-tech sector have about two and a half more years of schooling than
workers in the low tech sector. Moreover, high-tech establishments have a substantial
fraction of scientists, and are substantially more likely to invest in R&D.5. The distribution of immigrant employment
The unique feature of my analysis is the combination of the standard variables on in-
dustrial production with information on the type of workforce employed in each estab-
lishment. This information is taken from the supplemental surveys on the Structure of
the Labor Force (SLF), which were administered to all firms in the Manufacturing
Surveys in 1993 and 1997. These surveys collected information on the total number of
scientists, white-collar workers (“academics”), technicians, and production workers
employed in each establishment, and on the number of recently arrived immigrants in
each one of the above categories. This enables me to analyze the characteristics of firms
that employed immigrants, and to study whether firms who employed a large number
of highly educated immigrants experienced a boost in productivity.
Table 5 presents summary statistics for the SLF data. In the top panel, I present sta-
tistics for all the firms with non-missing data in 1993 and 1997, while the bottom panel
restricts attention only to those firms that appear in the sample in both 1993 and 1997
(the balanced sample). We must first note the large difference in establishment size
between the full sample and the balanced sample. The average number of employees in
the full sample is between 29 and 41, but it rises to 130 in the balanced sample. This
simply reflects the sampling scheme, whereby large establishments are sampled with
certainty, while small establishments only belong to the probability sample. Between
1993 and 1997, the share of firms with at least one immigrant drops from 0.69 to 0.51,
while the average number of immigrants per firm increases from 4.21 to 6.20. This in-
dicates that the employment of immigrants became more concentrated in fewer firms.
The average share of immigrants in the firm is fairly stable at 15 to 17 percent of the
total workforce.
In contrast to the stability of immigrant employment between 1993 and 1997, there
were substantial shifts in the occupational distribution of immigrants within firms, as
can be seen from Table 6. The percent of scientists among immigrants more than
Table 4 Firm characteristics, by technological intensity
Low-tech Medium-low tech Medium-high tech High-tech
1990 1993 1997 1990 1993 1997 1990 1993 1997 1990 1993 1997
Number of firms 990 1,061 832 629 703 655 305 324 284 152 166 179
Total Employment 129,215 145,976 137,841 74,353 91,446 109,470 51,030 48,904 49,768 40,018 46,916 56,555
Average years of Schooling 10.63 11.01 11.68 11.37 11.82 12.27 11.81 12.53 12.62 13.27 14.00 14.26
Percentage Scientists - 0.53% 1.27% - 2.43% 3.51% - 6.45% 8.15% - 23.43% 31.99%
Percentage of firms doing R&D - 0.59% 0.04% - 0.96% 0.54% - 4.46% 4.26% - 16.05% 21.03%























Number of firms with non-missing LFC data 2,254 1,437
Average number of employees 28.53 40.97
Share of firms hiring immigrants 0.692 0.514
Average number of immigrants in firm 4.21 6.20
Median number of immigrants in firm 1 1
Average share of immigrants in firm 0.152 0.155
Average share of immigrants in firms with at least one immigrants 0.218 0.301
Balanced sample
Number of firms with non-missing LFC data 762 617
Average number of employees 128.11 134.11
Share of firms hiring immigrants 0.933 0.697
Average number of immigrants in firm 26.82 34.04
Median number of immigrants in firm 18 13
Average share of immigrants in firm 0.174 0.170
Average share of immigrants in firms with at least one immigrants 0.186 0.244
Note: Firms in the balanced sample are firms that were present in the sample in 1990, 1993, and 1997.
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portion of immigrants who were scientists was higher than the overall proportion of
immigrants in the workforce (15.9 percent versus 15.1 percent). Also, by 1997 a sub-
stantial fraction of immigrants were employed in white-collar jobs and as technicians,
while the share of immigrants employed as production workers declined from nearly
94 percent to about 81.5 percent. These results further confirm that throughout the
1990s immigrants experienced substantial occupational upgrading, as they acquired
local labor market skills and were able to convert part of their imported human capital
into something valuable for Israeli employers.
We now move to the question of which industries and firms employed immigrants.
Figures 5 and 6 show the immigrant distribution across 25 two-digit manufacturing
industries. The dark bars represent high and medium-high tech industries, while the
light bars represent low and medium-low tech industries. In 1993 there does not seem








Immigrants Total Share of occupation
who are immigrants
Immigrants Total
Scientists 0.074 0.043 0.075 0.159 0.098 0.093
Academics 0.021 0.004 0.026 0.081 0.022 0.042
Technicians 0.028 0.016 0.072 0.111 0.064 0.088
Other
production
0.148 0.937 0.827 0.159 0.815 0.777
Total 0.130 1.000 1.000 0.151 1.000 1.000
Source: Author’s calculations from the Structure of Labor Force surveys.
Immigrant Distribution Across Industries, 1993
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Percentage Immigrants in Industry
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Figure 5 Immigrant Distribution across Industries, 1993.
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its high concentration of immigrants, and overall it does seem that there has been a
shift of immigrants towards more high-technology sectors.
In Table 7 I investigate directly the determinants of immigrant hiring at the firm
level. Specifically, I regress the share of immigrants in the firm, for both 1993 and0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Percentage Immigrants in Industry
Electronic components
Jewellery





Transport eq., excl. ships, aircraft
Medical and scientific equipment
Machinery, equipment, office mach.
Pharmaceuticals














Immigrant Distribution Across Industries, 1997
High and Medium-High TechLow and M edium-Low Techigh and ediu - igh ech                           Low and Medium-Low Tech
Figure 6 Immigrant Distribution Across Industries, 1997.







All available firms All available firms All firms in 1997 sample
Number employed: 10-24 0.009 (0.014) 0.001 (0.013) 0.008 (0.053) −0.006 (0.057) 0.051 (.044) 0.024 (0.044)
Number employed: 25-49 0.039** (0.152) 0.028* (0.015) −0.006 (0.042) −0.017 (0.055) 0.127** (0.044) 0.089** (0.041)
Number employed: 50-99 0.034** (0.015) 0.022 (0.015) −0.045 (0.044) −0.048 (0.050) 0.062 (0.042) 0.040 (0.041)
Number employed: 100+ 0.011 (0.015) −0.002 (0.015) −0.010 (0.047) −0.037 (0.049) 0.025 (0.040) −0.006 (0.038)
Log (K/L) 0.032* (0.009) 0.022** (0.008) 0.047 (0.027) 0.056* (0.029) 0.015 (0.013) 0.014 (0.013)
Log Wage −0.052** (0.018) −0.044** (0.016) 0.131** (0.055) 0.086** (0.042) −0.053* (0.031) −0.038 (0.030)
Log value added per worker 0.014 (0.015) 0.019 (0.013) −0.158** (0.062) −0.140** (0.054) 0.019 (0.021) 0.015 (0.021)
Output share in 3-digit industry −0.131** (0.065) −0.129* (0.066) −0.246** (0.149) −0.161 (0.136) −0.056 (0.064) −0.081 (0.066)
Three-firm concentration index (3-digit industry) 0.078** (0.037) 0.081** (0.039) −0.020 (0.114) 0.061 (0.121) −0.034 (0.050) 0.07 (0.055)
Output share × Concentration index −0.216** (0.096) −0.206** (0.101) 0.06 (0.218) 0.143 (0.221) −0.088 (0.086) −0.116 (0.085)
Import penetration index (3-digit industry) 0.099** (0.038) 0.119** (0.045) 0.264** (0.135) 0.364** (0.132) 0.015 (0.057) 0.021 (0.059)
Avg. years of schooling in 3-digit industry −0.021** (0.008) −0.017 (0.011) 0.013 (0.022) 0.042 (0.030) −0.014 (0.011) 0.001 (0.017)
High tech 0.047 (0.029) - 0.011 (0.087) - 0.009 (0.043) -
Medium-high tech 0.041* (0.022) - 0.029 (0.066) - 0.020 (0.032) -
Medium-low tech 0.061** (0.014) - 0.153** (0.052) - 0.020 (0.027) -
Any R&D 0.000 (0.014) 0.00 (0.014) −0.026 (0.031) −0.024 (0.033) 0.004 (0.021) −0.008 (0.021)
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2- digit industry dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1704 1704 616 616 609 609
R2 0.107 0.198 0.358 0.475 0.140 0.234
Note: Entries in the table represent weighted least squares coefficients, where the weights are the CBS sampling weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*: Statistically different from 0 at the 10% level.
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http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/61997, on a number of firm characteristics in 1990. This allows me to establish which
pre-immigration characteristics of establishments were conducive to the hiring of
immigrants. I include in the regressions a number of standard firm characteristics –
dummies for size, the capital-labor ratio, the 1990 average wage, and value added per
worker (all in logs). In addition, I include the concentration level of the industry, the
level of competition from imports, and whether the firm enjoys a dominant position
within the industry: these variables are meant to capture the fact that maybe workers
queue for jobs in firms that enjoy monopoly rents (Katz and Summers, 1989), and out-
siders such as immigrants are less likely to find jobs at these firms. Finally, I include a
number of indicators for the skill of the workforce and for technological intensity at
the industry level: the average years of schooling in the three-digit industry (taken from
the Labor Force Survey in 1989-1990), whether the firm engages in R&D, and dummies
for medium-low, medium-high and high-tech industries. I estimate two specifications,
with and without two-digit industry fixed effects. The regression is estimated separately
for 1993 and 1997.
The results for 1993 suggest that immigrants were more likely to be employed in
medium-sized firms rather than in very small or very large firms, but the differences
are small and not always statistically significant. More interesting is the coefficient on
the capital-labor ratio, which is positive and significant, confirming the intuitive notion
that firms that had room to grow (in the sense that they had a high capital-labor ratio)
were more likely to hire immigrants. Interestingly, there does not seem to be any cor-
relation between a firm’s productivity in 1990 and its propensity to hire immigrants in
1993. There is also some evidence that medium-low tech firms were more likely to hire
immigrants, and that immigrant employment is negatively correlated with the average
years of schooling in the industry in 1990, although this effect disappears when we con-
trol for two-digit industry dummies. The coefficients on the industry concentration var-
iables reveal an interesting pattern: immigrants are more likely to be employed in
highly concentrated industries, but not in those firms that enjoy a dominant position
within the industry. For example, a firm with a 40 percent output share in an industry
with a three-firm concentration index of 0.5 employs on average 5.7 percent (0.078×0.5 -
0.131×0.4 - 0.216×0.5×0.4 = -0.057) fewer immigrants than a (hypothetical) firm in a
perfectly competitive industry (i.e., infinitely small output share in an industry where the
concentration index is zero). By contrast, a firm in the same industry with only 5 percent
market share employs on average 2.7 percent more immigrants than its perfectly competi-
tive counterpart. Similarly, firms that were exposed to greater competition from imports
were more likely to employ immigrants. Coupled with the coefficients on the wage variable,
these results suggest that there may indeed be queuing for jobs in firms that enjoy monop-
oly rents and immigrants are the ones least likely to be close to the front of the queue.
The results for 1997 paint a slightly different picture: Now I find a positive correl-
ation between immigrant share and the 1990 wage, and a negative correlation between
immigrant concentration and productivity in 1990. It still seems to be the case that immi-
grants are less likely to be employed in firms that enjoy a dominant position in their mar-
ket, and they are more likely to be employed in firms that face stiff import competition,
but the other variables measuring industry concentration now become insignificant.
It is difficult to tell how much of the differences between 1993 and 1997 depend on
actual mobility of immigrants between firms, and how much instead depends on the
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establishments (mostly large ones) who were present in both the 1990 and 1997 sam-
ple. The last two columns of Table 7 illustrate this problem: I replicate the regressions
for the 1993 sample, but now using only those firms that were present in the sample in
both 1993 and 1997. Now essentially all the coefficients become insignificant, and it is
difficult to draw any strong conclusions about the determinants of immigrant hiring at
the firm-level.
Summing up, this section has showed that immigrants were distributed over the en-
tire spectrum of Israeli manufacturing firms. In the early 1990s, immigrants were con-
centrated in firms with room to grow and with low wages (possibly because access to
high paying jobs in firms that enjoy rents is obstructed), but we find little correlation
between these firm characteristics and immigrant concentration later in the decade.
Two additional findings deserve attention: first, immigrants were not more likely to be
employed in high technology firms, which may be viewed as surprising given their high
levels of human capital; second, there seems to be little or no correlation between a
firm’s productivity in 1990 and its propensity to employ immigrants later in the decade.
In the next section, where I examine the effect of immigrants on firm productivity, one
should keep in mind that there was no apparent pattern of immigrants selectively
sorting themselves into firms based on their level of productivity.
6. The effect of immigrants on productivity
In this section I estimate a standard production function at the firm level, including the
percentage of immigrants as a right hand-side variable. Assume that firms produce
output Y using a Cobb-Douglas production function with capital (K), intermediate inputs
(or materials, M), and labor (L) as its inputs. Native labor and immigrant labor (respectively,
LN and LI) are perfectly substitutable in production, but they may have different levels of
productivity13. Specifically, we write the firm’s production function as:
Y ¼ AKαMβ LN þ 1þ μð ÞLI½ γ ;
where the parameter μ denotes the difference in productivity between a unit of immigrant
labor relative to a unit of native labor. This difference in productivity may be positive, if for
example immigrant workers have on average higher levels of education, or negative, if im-
migrants face difficulties in adapting to the local work environment, because of language
barriers or other forms of low local human capital. I define s as the share of immigrants out
of total employment L, so that LI = sL, and LN = (1–s)L. Then, we can rewrite the produc-
tion function as:
Y ¼ AKαMβLγ 1−sð Þ þ 1þ μð Þs½ γ
¼ AKαMβLγ 1þ μs½ γ ;














þ αþ βþ γ−1ð Þ lnLit þ γμsit þ δ0Xit þ ci þ uit ;
where I have used the approximation ln(1 + μs) ≈ μs, and I have decomposed the tech-
nology shifter ln Ait into an observed component (δ’Xit) and a fixed unobserved
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shifters include the log of R&D expenditures, a dummy for whether the firm engages in
R&D at all, region dummies, and (in some specifications) industry dummies. The ci
term is a time-invariant firm specific effect, which is potentially correlated with firm in-
puts, while uit is an idiosyncratic error term, uncorrelated with firm inputs. Therefore,
the estimating framework reduces to a standard production function, with the propor-
tion of immigrants as an additional right hand side variable.
The coefficients in the above equation can be given a causal interpretation if all the
unobserved terms are indeed uncorrelated with the inputs, or if the fixed firm effects
can be made to drop out of the equation by either first differencing or by subtracting
firm-specific means from both sides of the equation (the within estimator). For the mo-
ment, the maintained assumption is that there are no time-varying unobservables at
the firm level that are correlated with the fraction of immigrant workers. While this is
a fairly strong assumption, it should be remembered that the regressions already
control for the standard determinants of productivity and for fairly detailed industry
dummies, so that any productivity shocks occurring at the industry level are already
accounted for. Later, in the industry-level analysis, I will address the potential
endogeneity concern using an instrumental variable strategy14.Basic results
Table 8 presents the results from cross-sectional and pooled estimation of the produc-
tion function. These estimates do not include firm fixed effects. Table 9 instead shows
results from estimation of the model in first differences, with the firm fixed effect
differenced out. All regressions are estimated by weighted least squares, using as
weights the CBS provided sampling weights.
The coefficients of the production function in Table 8 are in line with much of the
previous literature, and specifically with the findings of Griliches and Regev for the
1972-1988 period. The coefficient on capital in the production function ranges from
0.16 to 0.28, while the coefficient on intermediate inputs is between 0.42 and 0.52. The
coefficient on employment reveals some evidence for increasing returns to scale, even
though one must be cautious with this specification because of the potential
endogeneity problem. What is most striking in the table, though, is the fact that the
share of immigrants seems to be completely unrelated to productivity. In all specifica-
tions, the coefficient on the share of immigrants is small and insignificant, both statisti-
cally and economically. For example, the last column (the most comprehensive
specification, with both years of data and including industry fixed effects) indicates that
an increase in the share of immigrants from 0 to 0.1 is associated with a 0.22 percent
increase in labor productivity, and one can rule out effects larger than 0.8 percent. At
the bottom of the Table 1 present the implied values of the production function param-
eters. The implied value of μ ranges between –0.123 to 0.067, and is never statistically
significant.
In Table 9, I address the possibility that immigrant concentration was correlated with
a fixed unobservable component of firm productivity by estimating the firm’s
production function in first-differenced form. I estimate the relationship separately for
1990-1993 (assuming that the share of immigrants in all firms was zero in 1990) and
Table 8 Production functions, cross-sectional and pooled estimates full sample dependent variable: lo utput per worker
1993 1993 1997 19 Pooled, 1993-1997 Pooled, 1993-1997
Share immigrants −0.044 (0.054) 0.022 (0.055) −0.034 (0.038) 0.008 33) −0.034 (0.033) 0.022 (0.029)
Log capital per worker 0.165** (0.012) 0.242** (0.018) 0.201** (0.019) 0.278** .024) 0.182** (0.012) 0.245** (0.015)
Log materials per worker 0.517** (0.015) 0.465** (0.018) 0.472** (0.020) 0.424** .020) 0.497** (0.014) 0.453** (0.014)
Log employment 0.042** (0.008) 0.041** (0.007) 0.048** (0.009) 0.042** .008) 0.044** (0.006) 0.040** (0.006)
Log R&D expenditures 0.048** (0.009) 0.018** (0.009) 0.026 (0.026) 0.019 25) 0.039** (0.011) 0.011 (0.010)
1 if no R&D −0.183** (0.028) −0.096** (0.028) −0.176** (0.052) −0.059 .063) −0.178** (0.027) −0.066** (0.031)
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Y Yes Yes
3-digit industry dummies No Yes No Y No Yes
N 2087 2087 1421 14 3508 3508
R2 0.863 0.895 0.850 0.8 0.855 0.887
Implied production function parameters
α 0.165** (0.012) 0.242** (0.018) 0.201** (0.019) 0.278** .024) 0.182** (0.012) 0.245** (0.015)
β 0.517** (0.015) 0.465** (0.018) 0.472** (0.020) 0.424** .020) 0.497** (0.014) 0.453** (0.014)
γ 0.359** (0.017) 0.334** (0.016) 0.374** (0.020) 0.340** .021) 0.365** (0.013) 0.341** (0.013)
μ −0.123 (0.150) 0.067 (0.164) −0.092 (0.102) 0.023 97) −0.092 (0.089) 0.066 (0.086)
Note: Entries in the table represent weighted least squares coefficients, where the weights are the CBS sampling weights. Robust standard ors in parentheses.
*: Statistically different from 0 at the 10% level.


































Table 9 Production functions – first differences estimates dependent variable: change in log output per worker
Sample: all available firms Sample: balanced sample
1990-1993 1993-1997 Pooled 1990-1993 1993-1997 Pooled
Share Immigrants −0.048 (0.059) −0.094** (0.042) −0.073** (0.030) 0.065 (0.067) −0.056 (0.042) −0.029 (0.036)
Log capital per worker 0.188** (0.044) 0.068 (0.044) 0.121** (0.028) 0.168** (0.048) 0.049 (0.041) 0.071** (0.034)
Log materials per worker 0.584** (0.031) 0.490** (0.056) 0.567** (0.030) 0.651** (0.044) 0.449** (0.055) 0.493** (0.050)
Log employment 0.085* (0.044) −0.029 (0.045) 0.032 (0.028) 0.029 (0.039) −0.089** (0.038) −0.052 (0.035)
Log R&D expenditures 0.006 (0.013) 0.001 (0.023) −0.009 (0.011) 0.007 (0.015) 0.006 (0.022) −0.009 (0.012)
1 if no R&D expenditures −0.028 (0.059) −0.030 (0.152) −0.088 (0.060) 0.012 (0.079) −0.005 (0.153) −0.063 (0.073)
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1700 661 2361 611 611 1222
R2 0.766 0.864 0.780 0.812 0.832 0.773
Implied production function parameters
α 0.188** (0.044) 0.068 (0.044) 0.121** (0.028) 0.168** (0.048) 0.049 (0.041) 0.071** (0.034)
β 0.584** (0.031) 0.490** (0.056) 0.567** (0.030) 0.651** (0.044) 0.449** (0.055) 0.493** (0.050)
γ 0.312** (0.027) 0.413** (0.039) 0.344** (0.024) 0.210** (0.045) 0.413** (0.034) 0.385** (0.035)
μ −0.154 (0.189) −0.227** (0.095) −0.211** (0.086) 0.310 (0.349) −0.136 (0.100) −0.076 (0.092)
Note: All the explanatory variables are expressed in first differences. Entries in the table represent weighted least squares coefficients, where the weights are the CBS sampling weights. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
*: Statistically significant at the 10% level.


















Paserman IZA Journal of Migration 2013, 2:6 Page 19 of 31
http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/61993-1997, and then pooling both periods together. The first three columns of the table
present the results based on the sample of all available firms, while the next three col-
umns restrict attention only to the balanced sample of firms that were surveyed in all
three years (1990, 1993 and 1997). I now find some evidence of an adverse effect of the
change in immigrant share on productivity growth for the 1993-1997 period and for
the pooled specification, but the effect disappears in the balanced sample. In contrast
to what seemed to emerge from the time series evidence, at the microeconomic level
there is clearly no evidence of a positive effect of immigrant concentration on firm
productivity.Robustness Checks
I now verify whether the results are robust to using total factor productivity rather than
just output per worker as the dependent variable. To calculate total factor productivity
at the firm level, I use the factor share approach. For each year, I calculate the share of
output accruing to labor, capital and intermediate inputs at the three-digit industry
level, and I then calculate total factor productivity at the firm level as TFPijt = ln(Yijt) −
αjt ln Lijt − βjt ln Kijt − γ jt lnMijt, where i denotes firms, j denotes industries, and t de-
notes time. I then regress these measures of total factor productivity on the share of
immigrants and on the other elements of the production function. The results are
presented in Table 10. The first column estimates the regression in levels, while the
second and third columns use the first-difference specification for the 1993-1997
period, for the full and balanced samples, respectively. Once again, it appears that, if
anything, the share of immigrants has a negative effect on firm productivity.
In Table 11, I perform a series of specification checks of the basic production func-
tion estimates. For all specifications, I report the results for the regression in levels, inTable 10 Immigrants and total factor productivity: the output share approach
dependent variable: total factor productivity
Levels, all available







Share immigrants −0.032 (0.036) −0.093** (0.043) −0.060 (0.064)
Log capital per worker 0.140** (0.015) 0.0249 (0.041) −0.028 (0.047)
Log materials per worker −0.099** (0.014) 0.014 (0.030) −0.051 (0.045)
Log employment 0.162** (0.006) 0.152** (0.041) 0.345 (0.043)
Log R&D expenditures 0.062** (0.019) −0.018 (0.021) −0.023 (0.025)
1 if no R&D expenditures 0.279** (0.124) −0.124 (0.113) 0.118 (0.146)
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes
3-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 3508 2361 1222
R2 0.742 0.532 0.631
Note: The dependent variable is firm-level TFP calculated as TFPijt = ln(Yijt) − αjt ln Lijt − βjt ln Kijt − γjt lnMijt, where i denotes
firm, j denotes industry, and t denotes time. These measures are calculated using all the available data from the
Industrial Surveys from 1990 to 1999.
*: Statistically significant at the 10% level.
**: Statistically significant at the 5% level.
Table 11 Production functions – nonlinearities and interactions
Levels, all available firms, 1993 and 1997 First differences, all available firms,
1990-1993 and 1993-1997
First differences, balanced sample,
1990-1993 and 1993-1997
Nonlinearities in immigrant share
Share immigrants 0.047(0.079) 0.028 (0.085) −0.036 (0.113)
Share immigrants square −0.039 (0.097) −0.132 (0.105) 0.010 (0.166)
Industry dummies 3 digit 3 digit 3 digit
Immigrant share and firm size
Share immigrants × number employed 0-9 0.087 (0.067) −0.110** (0.043) −0.181 (0.124)
Share immigrants × number employed 10-49 0.011 (0.038) −0.040 (0.042) 0.007 (0.054)
Share immigrants × number employed 50-99 0.004 (0.049) −0.050 (0.042) −0.055 (0.046)
Share immigrants × number employed 100 + −0.220** (0.065) −0.056 (0.047) −0.030 (0.060)
Industry dummies 3 digit 3 digit 3 digit
Immigrant share and technological intensity
Share immigrants × low tech industry −0.104** (0.048) −0.126** (0.032) −0.175** (0.044)
Share immigrants × medium-low tech industry −0.015 (0.049) 0.065 (0.060) 0.022 (0.061)
Share immigrants × medium-high tech industry −0.034 (0.058) 0.155** (0.061) 0.060 (0.089)
Share immigrants × high tech industry −0.044 (0.218) −0.030 (0.117) 0.311** (0.137)
Industry dummies None None None
Immigrant share and 1989-1990 average years of schooling in industry
Share immigrants × (average years of schooling ≤ 10.5) 0.009 (0.059) −0.123** (0.034) −0.111 (0.077)
Share immigrants × (average years of schooling ∈ [10.5, 11.5) −0.014 (0.042) 0.045 (0.053) −0.012 (0.057)
Share immigrants × (average years of schooling > 11.5 −0.018 (0.067) 0.063 (0.071) 0.065 (0.084)
Industry dummies 2 digits 2 digits 2 digits
Number of observations 3,508 2,361 1,222
*: Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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1993 and 1997. In the top panel of the table, I assess whether the apparent lack of a
correlation between the percentage immigrants and productivity is due to nonlinearities
in the production function. For example, it could be that immigrants yield productivity
gains only if they are in concentrated clusters where there can be knowledge spillovers.
This conjecture is soundly rejected: the quadratic term is always small and insignificant,
and including it never changes the fact that the linear term is also small and
insignificant.
An alternative conjecture is that the effect of immigrants varies by firm size. Again,
this could be because knowledge spillovers can occur only in relatively large firms. The
different specifications do not present a consistent pattern: in the regression in levels, it
appears that the effect of immigrants is most pronouncedly negative in large establish-
ments, while the differences specification suggests that the immigrant share has a nega-
tive effect on productivity especially in small firms. Overall, it is unlikely that the
explanation for the lack of an effect of immigrant concentration on productivity lies in
differences between small and large firms.
The next two panels investigate whether the effect of immigrants on productivity
depends on the firm’s level of technological intensity, and on the pre-existing level of
skills at the industry level15. The third panel reveals that the share of immigrants is
consistently negatively associated with productivity in low-tech industries, and the coef-
ficient is always statistically significant at the 5 percent level. By contrast, there is some
evidence for a positive effect of the immigrants share on productivity in high technol-
ogy firms, especially in the first-difference specifications. However, the size and signifi-
cance of the effect are sensitive to whether I use the full or the balanced sample.
The last panel in Table 11 paints a similar picture, although the results are somewhat
less precise. There is some evidence that immigrant concentration is negatively corre-
lated with productivity in industries that had a relatively low-skill workforce prior to
the migration wave, and is positively correlated with productivity in industries with a
high skilled workforce.
I next investigate the hypothesis that perhaps only immigrants who are employed
in occupations where their skills can really be put to good use (i.e., scientists) have a
positive effect on productivity. I explore this possibility in Table 12. For all three
specifications (levels, first differences on the full sample, first differences on the bal-
anced sample), I run a regression that includes the immigrant share among scientists
and the immigrant share in all other occupations as right hand side variables. The
top panel looks at the relationship in all firms. In all specifications, the correlation
between the share of immigrant scientists and productivity is positive but not statis-
tically significant. On the other hand, the coefficient on the share of immigrants in
other occupations reflects the results of Tables 8 and 9: small and insignificant in the
levels specification, negative and significant in the first difference specification in the
full sample, negative and insignificant in the first-difference specification in the bal-
anced sample. The next panels of the table examine whether the effect of immigrant
scientists differs by the type of industry. The correlation between the share of immi-
grants in other occupations and productivity is similar to the one found in Table 11.
Interestingly, though, we also find a strong negative correlation between the share of
immigrant scientists and productivity in low-tech industries, suggesting that
Table 12 Production functions – immigrant scientists versus others
Levels, all available firms, 1993 and 1997 First differences, all available firms,
1990-1993 and 1993-1997














All firms 0.386 (0.438) 0.013 (0.030) 0.014 (0.198) −0.073** (0.028) 0.221 (0.229) −0.034 (0.040)
Industry dummies 3 digit 3 digit 3 digit
Low tech industries 1.005 (0.664) −0.108 (0.049) −0.977** (0.225) −0.119** (0.032) −0.734** (0.258) −0.154** (0.050)
Medium-low tech industries −0.290 (0.279) −0.009 (0.050) 0.185 (0.131) 0.058 (0.063) 0.254 (0.294) 0.019 (0.069)
Medium-high tech industries 0.092 (0.212) −0.046 (0.059) 0.677 (0.467) 0.131** (0.057) 0.220 (0.628) 0.056 (0.094)
High tech industries 1.250 (0.882) −0.267 (0.174) −0.219 (0.460) 0.045 (0.118) 0.541 (0.402) 0.271* (0.148)
Industry dummies None None None
Average years of schooling ≤ 10.5 −0.352 (0.512) 0.014 (0.059) 0.241 (0.181) −0.125** (0.034) 0.707 (0.819) −0.124 (0.077)
Average years of schooling ∈ [10.5, 11.5) −0.046 (0.386) −0.014 (0.044) 0.137 (0.263) 0.043 (0.057) 0.241 (0.364) −0.013 (0.066)
Average years of schooling > 11.5 0.708 (0.600) −0.079 (0.074) −0.215 (0.390) 0.086 (0.065) −0.150 (0.332) 0.056 (0.087)
Industry dummies 2 digits 2 digits 2 digits
*: Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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tists in other technology categories is never statistically significant. Finally, splitting
industries based on the level of education in 1989-1990 yields mostly insignificant
coefficients. Altogether, there does not seem to be too much evidence that immi-
grants employed as scientists had any positive effects on productivity, either overall
or in specific industries.Industry-level regressions
Finally, I investigate the hypothesis that a firm’s productivity is affected not only by
its own characteristics, but also by its surroundings. For example, productive ideas
from FSU immigrants might spillover to competing firms, or perhaps induce com-
petitors (with fewer FSU immigrants) to develop independently productive ideas. If
this is the case, there could be an aggregate positive effect of immigration on prod-
uctivity without one that showed up differentially across plants.
To assess this conjecture, I re-estimate the production functions with data aggre-
gated up to the three-digit industry level. If spillovers occur at the three-digit indus-
try level (but there are no spillovers across industries), we would expect to find a
positive effect of the immigrant share on productivity, even if there is no correlation
between immigrant share and productivity within industries. One of the advantages
of using the aggregated data is that I can use the Labor Force surveys to calculate a
yearly series of the immigrant share at the industry level. This enables me to exploit
the data from 1990 to 1999 in its entirety.Table 13 Production functions, three-digit industries
Dependent variable: log output per worker
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects, IV (Instrument:
predicted immigrant share)
Share immigrants −0.284** (0.086) −0.028 (.040) 0.216 (.554) 0.052 (.173) −0.004 (.308)
Log capital per worker 0.100** (.021) 0.007 (.013) 0.001 (.015) 0.005 (0.014) 0.006 (.013)
Log materials
per worker
0.782** (.022) 0.797** (.025) 0.806** (.030) 0.801** (.024) 0.797** (.026)
Log employment 0.021 (.014) −0.035** (.015) −0.037** (.017) −0.041** (.018) −0.045** (.018)
Time controls Year dummies Year dummies Year dummies Two time periods Linear time trend
N 760 760 760 760 760
R2 0.960 0.938 0.875 0.882 0.882
First stage F- statistic - - 5.014 17.05 10.79
Implied production function parameters
α 0.100** (.021) 0.007 (.013) 0.001 (.015) 0.005 (0.014) 0.006 (.013)
β 0.782** (.022) 0.797** (.025) 0.806** (.030) 0.801** (.024) 0.797** (.026)
γ 0.139** (.019) 0.162** (.021) 0.156** (.026) 0.153** (.021) 0.153** (.026)
μ −2.047** (.695) −0.173 (.246) 1.390 (3.680) 0.339 (1.144) −0.025 (2.012)
Notes: Entries in the table represent the coefficients in a production function regression estimated at the three-digit industry
level. The share of immigrants at the three-digit industry level is taken from the Labor Force Surveys. See text for the
description of the instrument. Robust standard errors robust, adjusted for clustering at the industry level, in parentheses.
*: Statistically significant at the 10% level.
**: Statistically significant at the 5% level.
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presented in the first two columns of Table 13. The pooled OLS specification reveals
a very large negative coefficient on the share of immigrants (perhaps implausibly so),
but the coefficient probably reflects mostly the sorting of immigrants across indus-
tries (see also Table 7). The coefficients in the fixed effects specification are quite
similar to those obtained in using the firm-level data.
An additional advantage of using the aggregated data is that it becomes possible to
address the potential endogeneity of the immigrant share using an instrumental vari-
able strategy. The instrument is an adaptation of the Card (2001) shift-share instru-
ment. Specifically, I calculate for every three-digit industry the predicted number of
immigrants assuming that the post-1989 distribution of immigrants across industries
was the same as the one in 1983. The distribution of immigrants across industries in
1983 is calculated using the Israeli Census, and immigrants are defined to be those
individuals who migrated to Israel after 1971. The rationale for this instrument is
that it isolates only the part of the variation in the immigrant share due to the ten-
dency of immigrants to be employed in sectors where previous cohorts of immi-
grants were employed (perhaps because newer cohorts of immigrants are referred to
jobs by less recent immigrants in the industries in which they are employed). Thus,
the instrument should be uncorrelated with any productivity shocks at the industry
level that occurred after 1989.
The IV results (with industry fixed effects) are presented in the last three columns
of Table 13. It turns out that the estimates are somewhat sensitive to the exact speci-
fication of the time controls. In the base specification (with a full set of year dum-
mies, column 3), the first stage F-statistic is quite small, indicating that there is likely
to be a weak-instrument problem. The coefficient on the immigrant share is large
and positive, but estimated quite imprecisely. Imposing more structure on the pat-
tern of time effects (columns 4 and 5) alleviates the weak instruments problem (the
first stage F-statistics are now above 10 in both specifications), and the coefficient on
the share of immigrants becomes small and insignificant. The returns to scale pa-
rameters are not very sensitive to specification of the time effects, whereas the par-
ameter μ is, but it is estimated too imprecisely to draw strong conclusions.
Overall, the findings of the industry-level analysis are in accordance with those
obtained using the firm-level data: there is little evidence that immigrants had any
effect on productivity, nor is there evidence of knowledge spillovers at the
industry level.7. Conclusion
This paper has studied whether the high-skilled migration wave from the former So-
viet Union to Israel had any effects on the productivity of Israeli manufacturing
firms. The paper uses a unique micro-level data set, in which standard measures of
productivity are augmented with information on the composition of the workforce,
and, specifically, the share of immigrants at the firm level. Even though the macro-
economic is suggestive of a causal link between immigration and productivity, the
detailed micro-level analysis reveals no evidence of a positive correlation between
a higher concentration of immigrants and firm productivity. If anything, there is
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in low-technology industries. There is some evidence of a positive effect of immi-
grants on productivity in high technology industries, but the magnitude and signifi-
cance of the results are sensitive to the econometric specification. An industry-level
analysis provides no support for the hypothesis of knowledge spillovers at the indus-
try level.
It is worthwhile to try to reconcile these results with those in the existing litera-
ture. Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny (2002), using data from the U.S. manufacturing
sector and an econometric approach that is similar to mine, similarly find no evi-
dence of a positive relationship between the immigrant share and labor productivity.
They conclude that “slower productivity growth may be the result of the gradual
process of assimilation for many immigrants; the negative effect on productivity
growth may disappear as immigrants acquire language skills and familiarity with U.S.
labor market institutions.” (Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny, 2002, p. 10). On the other
hand, Peri (2011), using a longer time period and data aggregated at the state level,
and not limited to the manufacturing sector, reaches the opposite conclusion. He
conjectures that part of the productivity effect may be attributable to efficient
specialization of immigrants and natives in different types of tasks. My results are in
fact consistent with both studies: at the macroeconomic level, I also find that total
factor productivity increased in the medium-run (as in Peri), even though there is no
evidence of increased labor productivity at the firm or the industry level (as in
Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny). One can reconcile these findings using a version of
Peri’s efficient specialization hypothesis, in which immigrants and natives sort them-
selves efficiently across industries to increase aggregate productivity. This conclu-
sion, however, should be viewed with some caution, given the absence of a direct link
between immigration and productivity.
What lessons then can be learned about the effects of high-skill immigration on
productivity for other countries that plan to move towards a more skill-biased immi-
gration policy? This paper raises some doubts as to whether Israel succeeded in
exploiting the extraordinary windfall in human capital represented by the Soviet
immigration to its full extent. Of course, the Israeli experience has some distinctive
features that set it apart from other countries. The sheer magnitude of the migration
wave made it more difficult for immigrants to find suitable jobs, and many immi-
grants fled the disintegrating Soviet Union in haste, and with little prior knowledge
of their chances to integrate successfully in the host country. However, other features
of this migration wave are likely to be shared by other immigrant-receiving countries.
Language and cultural barriers may prevent immigrants, potentially even the highly
skilled ones, from rapidly assimilating and contributing to the economy in propor-
tion to their potential.Endnotes
1 See Friedberg and Hunt (1995) for a survey of the early literature, or Card (2005),
for a more recent appraisal. On the other hand, Borjas (2003) argues that immigration
does have an adverse effect on the employment and wages of natives with the same
education and experience as that of immigrants, but there is some debate about the
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Ottaviano and Peri 2012). Studies of the Israeli experience in the 1990s have also found
contrasting results: Friedberg (2001) finds that the effect of immigration on native
wages and employment is sensitive to the estimation procedure, while Cohen-Goldner
and Paserman (2011) find some adverse effect on wages in the short run, but no effect
in the long run.
2 For example, in the US output per hour in manufacturing grew at an average
annual rate of 4.7 percent from 1990 to 2000, a substantial increase from the 2.8
percent increase during the 1980s (Source: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/prod4.
nr0.htm).
3 Other papers that have looked at how the educational composition of the workforce
affects productivity are Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (1999) and Jones (2001).
4 The data are from the Bank of Israel Annual Report (2003).
5 See the Appendix for the full classification of industries by technological
intensity.
6 About 85% of post-1989 immigrants arrived from the Former Soviet Union. The
current discussion does not distinguish immigrants by country of origin, as this infor-
mation is also not available in the firm-level data used in the main analysis.
7 The LFS is the main source for labor force statistics in Israel, and it is the equiva-
lent of the Current Population Survey in the United States.
8 Weiss, Sauer and Gotlibovski (2003) report that more than 70% of the immigrants
worked in high-skill or medium-skill occupations in the USSR, and the supply of engi-
neers and physicians roughly doubled between 1989 and 1993.
9 Capital per worker in the manufacturing sector was derived directly from the micro
data. See below (Section 4) for details of the calculations.
10 The dynamic adjustment of the capital stock is key for understanding the evolution
of wages over time in response to a migration shock (see Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; and
Cohen-Goldner and Paserman, 2011, who present empirical evidence of this adjust-
ment in the Israeli context).
11 For more detailed descriptions of the sampling procedures, see Israel Central
Bureau of Statistics (various years).
12 Specifically, I assumed that buildings depreciate fully after 35 years, equipment
after 15 years, and vehicles after 8 years.
13 See Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (1999) and Hellerstein and Neumark (1999)
for a more elaborate version of this approach.
14 I have also tried to use the Olley and Pakes semiparametric estimator (Olley and
Pakes, 1996), which explicitly accounts for the potential endogeneity of input demands,
even after controlling for firm fixed effects. The resulting estimates are qualitatively
and quantitatively similar to the ones reported here.
15 The specification in the third panel does not include industry dummies, since
technological intensity essentially varies only at the 2-digit industry level (there is
within variation in the measure of technological intensity only in two 2-digit indus-
tries: 24 - manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; and 35 - manufacture
of transport equipment). The specification in the fourth panel includes only 2-digit
industry dummies, since the average level of schooling varies at the 3-digit
industry level.
Table 14 Manufacturing industries, by technological intensity
Low-tech Medium-low tech Medium-high tech High-tech
140 Processing of meat and poultry 130 Quarrying of stone and sand 230 Manufacture of refined petroleum
and its products
245 Manufacture of pharmaceutical products
for human veterinary use
141 Processing of fruit and vegetables 131 Mining of minerals and extraction of salts 231 Processing of nuclear fuel 300 Manufacture of office machinery
142 Processing of fish 138 Mining and quarrying of non-metallic
minerals n.e.c.
240 Manufacture of basic industrial chemicals 301 Manufacture of automatic data
processing machinery
143 Manufacture of edible oils, margarine
and oil products
241 Manufacture of fertilizers 320 Manufacture of electronic components
144 Manufacture of dairy products
and ice cream
250 Manufacture of plastic boards and pipes 242 Manufacture of petrochemicals and
plastics in primary forms
321 Manufacture of semi-conductors
145 Manufacture of grain mill products 251 Manufacture of plastic sleeves and sheets 243 Manufacture of pesticides and disinfectants 330 Manufacture of telecommunication
equipment
146 Bakeries 244 Manufacture of paints and varnishes 331 Manufacture of data-communication
equipment
147 Manufacture of cakes, cookies and biscuits 252 Manufacture of plastic containers and bottles 246 Manufacture of soap, detergents and cosmetics 332 Manufacture of domestic electronic
equipment
148 Manufacture of unleavened bread 247 Manufacture of man-made fibers 340 Manufacture of industrial equipment
for control and supervision
149 Manufacture of noodles and pastry 253 Manufacture of products from armored 248 Manufacture of chemical products n.e.c. 341 Manufacture of medical and surgical
equipment
150 Manufacture of sugar plastic 290 Manufacture of general purpose machinery
and equipment, parts and maintenance thereof
342 Manufacture of instruments for
measuring, testing, and navigating
151 Manufacture of chocolate, cocoa,
and sugar confectionery
254 Manufacture of plastic products for kitchen,
table and domestic uses
291 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry
machinery parts and maintenance thereof
343 Manufacture of optical instruments
and photographic equipment
152 Manufacture of prepared food 255 Manufacture of plastic products for
technical, agricultural and industrial uses
292 Manufacture of industrial machinery,
parts and maintenance thereof
355 Manufacture of aircraft
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Table 14 Manufacturing industries, by technological intensity (Continued)
158 Manufacture of food products n.e.c 293 Manufacture of machinery for construction
and road works, parts and maintenance thereof
160 Manufacture of wine and other alcoholic beverages 256 Manufacture of plastic products n.e.c. 294 Manufacture of domestic appliances
161 Manufacture of beer and malt 257 Manufacture of rubber products 310 Manufacture of electric motors, generators
and transformers
162 Manufacture of soft drinks 258 Manufacture of tyres and tubes 311 Manufacture of electricity distribution and
control apparatus
163 Manufacture of tobacco products 260 Manufacture of glass and glass products 312 Manufacture of insulated wire and cables
170 Spinning, winding and interweaving of yarns 313 Manufacture of cells and batteries
171 Weaving of fabrics 261 Manufacture of ceramic tiles 350 Manufacture of motor vehicles
172 Weaving of terry towels 262 Manufacture of other ceramic products 351 Manufacture of bodies for motor vehicles,
trailers and semi-trailers
173 Finishing of textiles 263 Manufacture of cement and plaster 352 Manufacture of parts for motor vehicles
174 Manufacture of bedclothes and bedspreads 264 Manufacture of articles of cement,
concrete,plaster and clay
354 Manufacture of railway equipment
175 Manufacturing of other textile products 265 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone 358 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c.
176 Manufacture of carpets and rugs 268 Manufacture of non-metallic
mineral products n.e.c
177 Manufacture of knitted fabrics
178 Manufacture of knitted wearing apparel 270 Manufacture of basic iron and steel
180 Manufacture of outwear (except knitted)
and tailors dressmakers
271 Manufacture of non-ferrous and
181 Manufacture of swim suits precious metals
182 Manufacture of underwear (excl. knitted) 272 Iron and steel founders
188 Manufacture of wearing apparel n.e.c. 273 Founders of non-ferrous metals
190 Tanneries 274 Manufacture of metal pipes


















Table 14 Manufacturing industries, by technological intensity (Continued)
191 Manufacture of footwear and footwear
articles of leather and its substitutes
192 Manufacture of products of leather
and leather substitutes n.e.c.
281 Metal processing (metal workshops)
200 Sawmills 282 Metal coating
201 Manufacture of plywood and by-products 283 Manufacture of cutlery
202 Manufacture of builders' carpentry and
joinery and of wood products n.e.c.
284 Manufacture of cutting and hand tools
210 Basic manufacture of paper and cardboard 285 Manufacture of plumbing fixtures
211 Manufacture of paper and cardboard products 286 Manufacture of tinware products
220 Publishing of books, pamphlets and
other publications
287 Manufacture of wire and wire products
222 Printing and service activities related to printing 288 Manufacture of metal products
n.e.c. and n.s.
223 Publishing and reproduction of recorded media 353 Building of ships and boats
360 Manufacture of furniture (excl. metal
and plastic one)
380 Manufacture of goldsmiths' articles
361 Manufacture of metal furniture 381 Manufacture of silversmiths' articles
362 Manufacture of plastic furniture 382 Manufacture of gift items
390 Manufacture of musical instruments
391 Manufacture of sports goods
392 Manufacture of toys and games
393 Manufacture of medical equipment and
orthopedic articles
394 Manufacture of disposable medical equipment
395 Manufacture of school and office supplies
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